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The price of Brent oil rose by around 70% from June 2017 to May 
2018, when it reached nearly $80 per barrel, the highest level since 
autumn 2014, although it has fallen in recent weeks to somewhat 
below $75 per barrel. This box estimates the macroeconomic 
impact on various economies of an oil price rise stemming from 
supply factors and discusses to what extent the size of the 
estimated effect for Spain may have decreased in the more recent 
period. 
As in any other market, the formation of oil prices is influenced 
by both demand and supply factors. The supply factors affecting 
oil prices include possible geopolitical tensions in oil producing 
areas, producers’ strategic behaviour, oil discoveries or new 
extraction techniques, while demand is determined basically by 
developments in world activity and, in the longer term, improvements 
in energy efficiency. Higher oil prices bring negative macroeconomic 
effects for importing countries, since they entail a transfer of 
income to producers and reduce the purchasing power of 
households and firms. However, these effects tend to be more 
adverse if the oil price rise derives from a supply shock than if it 
is due to an increase in world demand for this commodity, in 
which case the lower domestic expenditure can be offset by 
increased exports.
In practice, any analysis of the respective contributions of the 
supply and demand factors to oil price behaviour is subject to 
great uncertainty. That said, there is a certain consensus that the 
rise in the second half of last year was basically in response to an 
increase in demand generated by a synchronised upturn in 
economic activity and world trade. However, supply factors seem 
to have played a larger role in the price rises in the first half of 
2018, as a result of the high compliance of agreed cuts among 
producers, the sharp fall in Venezuelan production and the recent 
geopolitical tensions exacerbated in recent weeks by the re-
imposition of sanctions on Iran by the United States.
Given that the consequences of an oil price rise for oil importers 
are more severe when the price rise is due to supply factors, and 
that the evidence points to the increase in the first half of 2018 
being predominantly due to such factors, we will focus on the 
impact of supply-side shocks. For this purpose, we used the 
NiGEM global macroeconomic model1 to simulate the effects on 
BOX 3THE IMPACT OF AN OIL PRICE RISE ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
1  The model is specified as a set of error correction equations in which the 
dynamics are governed by short-term demand and in which supply 
subsequently takes on a progressively growing role. The technical 
assumptions are that nominal exchange rates remain unchanged and 
expectations are adaptive.
SOURCES: Banco de España and NiGEM.
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BOX 3THE IMPACT OF AN OIL PRICE RISE ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
GDP, consumer prices and the current account balance in various 
regions of the world that would result from a Brent oil price rise of 
$10 per barrel (equivalent to a percentage increase of 15% with 
respect to a base level of $65).
The impact is uneven across economies, depending on factors 
such as producer or importer status, oil derivatives intensity in 
consumption, tax structure and monetary policy response. As 
might be expected, the sign of the effects on activity and the 
external balance is positive in exporting countries and negative in 
importers (see Chart 1). The impact on inflation is always positive, 
being more marked in producing countries, since the expansionary 
effect on domestic demand must be added to the increase in 
costs, which is also seen in importers.2
The impact on the Spanish economy is comparatively large, which 
is explained by Spain’s high import intensity of energy products, 
especially oil. In particular, Spain’s current account balance 
undergoes a worsening of approximately 0.3 pp of GDP, which 
moreover shows a high degree of persistence. The estimated loss 
of GDP in Spain is -0.2 pp on average in the three years following 
the shock, which is somewhat higher than in other importers, and 
inflation is estimated to increase somewhat more in Spain (0.9 pp 
in the first year).
These impacts estimated using the model should be interpreted 
as an upper bound for two reasons. First, because in practice any 
oil price rise reflects not only supply but also demand factors. In this 
respect, simulations performed using the Quarterly Macroeconometric 
Model of the Banco de España (Modelo Trimestral del Banco de 
España) show somewhat smaller effects, which is consistent with 
the fact that the estimated elasticities in this model are an average 
of the effects of all the historically observed supply and demand 
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Toe = Tonne of oil equivalent.
b Degree of energy intensity = Domestic energy consumption/GDP.
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2  The increase in costs tends, however, to be relatively smaller in 
producing countries, given that the use of oil derivatives is often 
subsidised.
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shocks.3 Second, because there is evidence that in recent years 
importing economies have reduced their oil dependence. Indeed, 
Chart 2.1 shows that both energy consumption and net energy 
imports, in both cases per unit of GDP, have been decreasing 
approximately since 2005 in the euro area as a whole and particularly 
in Spain, where net imports per unit of GDP nevertheless continue 
to be comparatively greater. Among the factors explaining this 
behaviour are the improvement in energy efficiency (driven by 
technology), the improvements in renewable primary energy sources 
and the changes in the structure of the economy (particularly 
tertiarisation).4 In addition, although oil continues to be the main 
source of imported primary energy, its share in the total has been 
decreasing (see Chart 2.2).5 
All these developments are estimated to have contributed to a 
certain weakening of the negative relationship between oil price 
movements and the energy trade balance. The main question is 
whether, in addition, they have reduced the sensitivity of the non-
energy balance to oil price fluctuations, given the lower share of oil 
derivatives in the cost structure of production, an effect which 
would be magnified by a decrease in the sensitivity of wages to oil 
price fluctuations in recent years reported in the literature.6 If this 
were so, an oil price rise might be expected to have a somewhat 
less adverse impact on the economy’s external competitiveness 
than in the past. 
Chart 2.3 shows the results of a tentative test of the hypothesis 
that, over time, the various components of Spain’s goods and 
services balance and its current account balance as a whole have 
become less sensitive to oil price movements.7 In particular, this 
tool appears to indicate that, while from 1995 to 2000 an increase 
of 10% in oil prices caused the current account deficit to worsen 
by between 0.3 pp and 0.4 pp, the effect decreased to 0.2 pp in 
the period 2014-2018. In any event, this evidence is very preliminary, 
so it should be regarded with due caution until it is confirmed by 
further analysis.
3  Specifically, compared with the figures presented in the exercise conducted 
using NiGEM, the worsening of the current account balance would be 0.2 
pp of GDP (instead of 0.3 pp), the estimated loss of GDP would be 
somewhat more than 0.1 pp on average in the three years following the 
shock (instead of 0.2 pp), and the increase in inflation would be 0.6 pp 
(instead of 0.9 pp). For an evaluation with these elasticities of the role of the 
oil price fall observed from mid-2014 to end-2015 in explaining the upward 
surprises in Spanish GDP growth during the period 2014-2016, see Box 
1.2 of the 2016 Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España.
4  Thus, for example, final energy consumption per unit of value-added in 
the transport sector, the main user of oil derivatives, has decreased in 
recent years. Furthermore, this cutback will foreseeably become more 
marked in coming years as vehicles are more efficient (in 2016 only 21% 
of the stock of road motor vehicles were less than five years old, while in 
2005 this percentage was 42%). Regarding the tertiarisation of the 
economy, the share of services in the GVA of the economy rose from 
67% in 2005 to 74% in 2017.
5  In Spain, this has occurred at the expense of natural gas (see Box 3.1 of 
Chapter 3 “Current account adjustment”, Annual Report, 2016, Banco 
de España).
6  See Blanchard and Galí (2007), “The macroeconomic effects of oil 
shocks: why are the 2000s so different from the 1970s?”, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13368 and, for Spain, 
Álvarez, Sánchez and Urtasun (2017), “The effect of oil price fluctuations 
on Spanish inflation”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
7  Specifically, monthly data and five-year windows are used to estimate 
bivariate regressions of the various components of the goods and 
services balance as a ratio of GDP to year-on-year oil price growth.
